














on	 the	 US,	 I	 show	 how	 progressive	men	 reacted	 to	 feminism	 in	 the	 1970s	 by	 forming	 an	




generated	 new	 possibilities.	 I	 end	 by	 pointing	 to	 an	 emergent	 moderate	 men’s	 rights	





























western	 jurisdictions	 in	 varying	ways,	 ranging	 from	outright	 hostility,	 to	 sarcastic	 ridicule,	 to	




trace	 the	 two	most	 politically	 engaged	 tails	 of	 a	 continuum	 of	 gender	 politics	 –	 anti‐feminist	
men’s	rights	groups	and	pro‐feminist	men	allies	–	with	an	eye	to	understanding	how	moments	
of	historical	gender	 formation	shape	men’s	gender	politics.	First,	 I	draw	from	an	earlier	study	
that	 outlined	 the	 context	 that	 gave	 rise	 to	 opposing	 US	men’s	 movements	 in	 the	 1970s	 and	
1980s	(Messner	1997),	reiterating	parts	of	that	analysis	that	are	relevant	to	thinking	about	the	
concurrent	 and	 mutually	 antagonistic	 rise	 of	 men’s	 anti‐feminism	 and	 men’s	 pro‐feminism.	
Second,	I	draw	from	a	recent	study	of	men	anti‐rape	and	anti‐domestic	violence	activists	in	the	
US,	 to	 illuminate	 men’s	 current	 engagements	 with	 feminism	 and	 gender	 politics	 (Messner,	
Greenberg	and	Peretz	2015).	
	
The	1970s	and	 the	present	moment	generated	possibilities	 for	men’s	gender	politics:	 forks	 in	
the	 road,	 as	 it	 were.	 The	 image	 of	 historical	 forks	 in	 the	 road	 implies	 choices	 for	 men’s	
responses	to	feminism,	but	not	an	unlimited	range	of	‘free’	choices.	Rather,	feminist	challenges	
and	shifts	in	the	gender	order	confront	men	with	a	limited	field	of	structured	options:		stop	dead	
in	 your	 tracks,	 befuddled;	 attempt	 a	 U‐turn	 and	 retreat	 toward	 an	 idealized	 past	 of	 male	
entitlement;	turn	right	and	join	a	backlash	against	feminism;	or	bend	left	and	actively	support	
feminism.	 Adapted	 from	 Omi	 and	 Winant’s	 (1986)	 theory	 of	 racial	 formation,	 I	 introduce	
historical	gender	 formation,	 a	 concept	 that	provides	 a	more	nuanced	view	of	 the	dynamics	 of	
gender	 politics	 than	 the	 dualistic	 image	 of	 a	 fork	 in	 the	 road.	 Central	 to	 the	 theory	 of	 racial	
formation	 is	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 grassroots	 racial	 justice	movements	 of	 the	 1950s	 through	 the	
1970s	 wrested	 concessions	 from	 the	 state,	 altered	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 racial	 categories	 were	
defined,	and	created	new	foundations	upon	which	subsequent	racial	tensions	and	politics	arose.	
Similarly,	the	women’s	movements	of	the	1960s	and	1970s	wrested	concessions	from	the	state,	
challenged	 and	partially	 transformed	 cultural	 values	 about	 sex	 and	 gender,	 and	 succeeded	 in	
bringing	about	substantial	reforms	in	various	social	institutions.	Thus,	men’s	engagements	with	
gender	 politics	 today	 take	 place	 in	 a	 very	 different	 context	 –	 one	 partly	 transformed	 by	
feminism	–	than	they	did	 in	 the	1970s.	 I	will	demonstrate	that	 the	1970s	and	the	present	are	




By	 the	 early	 1970’s,	 following	 several	 years	 of	 organizing,	 the	women’s	 liberation	movement	
had	exploded	on	to	the	social	scene.	In	the	United	States,	the	most	visible	feminist	activism	took	
place	 ‘in	 the	 streets’:	 small	 local	 consciousness‐raising	 groups,	 grassroots	 groups	 linked	 by	
word‐of‐mouth	 and	 hand‐printed	 newsletters,	 a	 sprouting	 of	 local	 rape‐crisis	 centers	 and	
women’s	shelters	run	by	volunteers	in	private	homes	or	low‐rent	storefronts,	all	punctuated	by	
mass	public	demonstrations	for	women’s	rights	(Allen	1970;	Stansell	2010).	In	other	words,	in	
relation	 to	 male‐dominated	 institutions	 like	 the	 state,	 the	 economy,	 military,	 religion	 or	
medicine,	 feminism	 in	 the	 US	 was	 mostly	 on	 the	 outside	 looking	 in	 (with	 academia,	 where	
feminists	gained	an	earlier	foothold,	a	partial	exception).	The	1970s,	then,	was	a	time	of	deeply	
entrenched	 gender	 inequality	 across	 all	 institutions,	 against	 which	 a	 grassroots	 women’s	










does	 feminism	have	 to	do	with	us	 (Men’s	Consciousness‐Raising	Group	1971)?	 	 Some	 leaders	
promoted	 the	 idea	of	 a	 ‘men’s	 liberation	movement’	 that	would	work	 symmetrically	with	 the	
women’s	 liberation	movement	 to	bring	 about	progressive	personal	and	social	 change	 (Farrell	
1974;	Nichols	1975).	They	reasoned	that	a	men’s	liberation	program	that	emphasized	potential	
gains	for	men	might	draw	more	interest	than	one	that	positioned	men	as	oppressors	whose	only	









men;	 it	 was	 pretty	 hard	 to	 ignore	 that	 59	 per	 cent	 wage	 gap,	 the	 obvious	 lack	 of	 women	 in	
political	and	corporate	leadership	positions,	or	the	ubiquitous	violence	against	women.	But	they	
sought	 to	 attract	 men	 to	 feminism	 by	 stressing	 how	 the	 ‘male	 sex	 role’	 was	 ‘impoverished’,	






risk‐taking,	 and	 unhealthy	 daily	 practices	 like	 smoking	 and	 drinking.	 Progressive	 men’s	
liberationists	drew	from	the	works	of	psychologist	Joseph	Pleck	(1977)	who	argued	that	while	
women	 were	 oppressed	 by	 the	 female	 sex	 role,	 men	 were	 privileged	 and	 simultaneously	







politically	 progressive	 leaders	 began	 to	 assert	 a	 false	 symmetry,	 viewing	men	 and	women	 as	
differently	 but	 equally	 oppressed	 by	 sex	 roles	 (Farrell	 1974;	 Goldberg	 1976).	 This	 assertion	
generated	 critical	 distrust	 from	 politically	 radical	 women,	 and	 vigorous	 debate	 from	 more	
politically	 radical	men	 in	 the	movement.	By	 the	mid‐to‐late	1970’s,	men’s	 liberation	had	 split	
directly	 along	 this	 fissure.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	men’s	 rights	 organizations	 stressed	 the	 costs	 of	
narrow	conceptions	of	masculinity	to	men,	and	either	downplayed	or	angrily	disputed	feminist	
claims	 that	 patriarchy	 benefited	men	 at	 women’s	 expense.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 a	 profeminist	
(sometimes	called	‘anti‐sexist’)	men’s	movement	emphasized	the	primary	importance	of	joining	
with	 women	 to	 do	 away	 with	 men’s	 institutionalized	 privileges.	 Patriarchy	 may	 dehumanize	





fissuring	 of	 men’s	 liberation,	 the	 men’s	 rights	 movement	 continued	 to	 deploy	 a	 narrowly	
conservative	language	of	sex	roles.	Now	severed	from	its	progressive	roots,	a	more	reactionary	












a	 kneejerk	 backlash	 against	 feminism;	 it	 was	 a	 movement	 that	 co‐opted	 the	 liberal	 feminist	
language	 of	 symmetrical	 sex	 roles	 and	 then	 turned	 this	 language	 back	 on	 itself.	 	 Men’s	
liberationist‐turned	men’s	rights	advocate	Warren	Farrell	(1974),	for	instance,	borrowed	Betty	
Friedan’s	 (1963)	 idea	 that	 a	 ‘feminine	 mystique’	 oppressed	 women,	 arguing	 that	 men	 were	
trapped	 in	 a	 ‘masculine	 mystique’	 that	 narrowly	 positioned	 them	 as	 breadwinners	 and	




role	 is	 far	 more	 rigid	 than	 the	 female	 role,	 and	 because	 women	 have	 created	 a	 movement	
through	which	they	can	now	transcend	the	limits	of	culturally‐imposed	femininity.	Men’s	rights	
organizations	 broke	 from	 the	 men’s	 liberation	 movement’s	 gender	 symmetry	 and	 began	 to	
articulate	a	distinct	discourse	of	overt	and	angry	anti‐feminist	backlash.	By	the	late	1970’s	and	
early	1980’s,	men’s	rights	advocates	were	claiming	that	men	are	the	true	victims	of	prostitution,	
pornography,	 dating	 rituals,	 sexist	 media	 conventions,	 divorce	 settlements,	 false	 rape	
accusations,	 sexual	 harassment,	 and	 domestic	 violence	 (Baumli	 1985).	 And	 in	 subsequent	








work	 and	 pornography	 (Echols	 2002).	 Some	 key	 political	 efforts	 by	US	 feminists	 such	 as	 the	
Equal	Rights	Amendment	(ERA)	had	failed,	and	feminism	was	less	visible	as	a	mass	movement.	
However	 in	 1989	 sociologist	 Verta	 Taylor	 argued	 that	 the	 US	 feminist	 movement	 had	 not	
disappeared;	 rather,	 this	 was	 a	 time	 of	 ‘movement	 abeyance’,	 when	 activists	 in	 submerged	
networks	 continued	 to	 fight	 for	 equality,	 sustaining	 below‐the‐radar	 efforts	 that	 created	 the	
possibility	 for	 future	political	mobilizations.	At	 the	 same	 time,	 in	Canada,	Australia	 and	other	




But	 there	 was	 something	 more	 happening	 in	 the	 1980s	 and	 1990s	 US	 gender	 politics	 than	
‘movement	abeyance’.	Feminist	momentum	from	the	1970s	and	networks	of	 feminist	activists	
combined	with	 three	 substantial	 and	 interrelated	 social	 changes:	 	 the	 institutionalization	 and	
professionalization	 of	 feminism;	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	 widespread	 postfeminist	 cultural	
sensibility;	 and	 shifts	 in	 the	 political	 economy,	 including	 deindustrialization	 and	 the	 rise	 of	 a	
neoliberal	 state	 that	 slashes	 taxes	 for	 corporations	 and	 the	 rich,	 cuts	 public	 welfare	 and	
education,	 and	 celebrates	 individualism	 and	 the	 primacy	 of	 the	market.	 These	 three	 changes	
created	 the	 current	 moment	 of	 gender	 formation	 that	 makes	 possible	 a	 range	 of	 men’s	











the	National	Abortion	Rights	Action	League	 (NARAL),	 the	 institutionalization	 of	women’s	 and	
gender	 studies	 in	 universities,	 and	 the	 stabilization	 of	myriad	 community	 and	 campus‐based	
rape	 crisis	 and	 domestic	 violence	 centers	 (Martin	 1990).	 Thus,	 as	 was	 occurring	 in	 Canada,	
Australia	 and	elsewhere,	 feminists	 reformed	police	practices	 and	 legal	 responses	 to	 rape	 and	








fronts,	 including	 the	 creation	 of	 career	 paths	 for	 feminists	 in	 law,	 academia,	medicine,	 social	
work	and	other	professions	(Staggenborg	1988).	But	on	the	other	hand	it	 led	to	a	diversion	of	
activist	 energies	 away	 from	 radical	 social	 change	 efforts	 toward	 finding	 sustainable	 funding	
sources	 for	 service	 provision,	 and	 also	 ushered	 in	 different	 organizational	 processes,	 with	
bureaucratic	 hierarchies	 displacing	 earlier	 feminist	 commitments	 to	 democratic	 decision‐
making	processes.	
	
US	 feminists	also	managed	to	wrest	significant	concessions	 from	the	state,	 including	the	1974	
passage	 of	 Title	 IX	 (federal	 law	 related	 to	 gender	 equity	 in	 schools),	 and	 the	 1994	 Violence	
Against	 Women	 Act,	 which	 altered	 the	 landscape	 for	 feminist	 work	 against	 gender‐based	
violence.	Even	given	the	fact	that	state	support	for	women’s	issues	in	the	US	remained	minimal,	
Kristen	 Bumiller	 (2013)	 argues	 that	 such	 ‘feminist	 collaboration	with	 the	 state’	 threatens	 to	
water	down,	or	even	sever,	the	language	and	grassroots	politics	of	feminism.	Moreover,	with	the	






of	 feminist	action,	while	simultaneously	 thinning	 its	political	depth,	 threatening	even	 to	make	
feminist	 language	 and	 analysis	 disappear	 altogether:	 	 university	 women’s	 studies	 programs	
become	‘gender	studies	programs’;	‘violence	against	women’	morphs	to	‘gender‐based	violence’;	
and	 feminist	 organizations	 created	 by	 and	 for	 women	 become	 mixed‐gender	 organizations	
whose	historical	roots	are	easily	forgotten	in	the	crush	of	day‐to‐day	struggles	to	measure	and	











But	 on	 the	 other	 side	 most	 scholars	 have	 drawn	 a	 distinction	 between	 postfeminism	 and	
opposition	 to	 feminism.	Postfeminist	narratives	normally	 include	an	appreciation	 for	 feminist	
accomplishments,	coupled	with	a	belief	that	the	work	of	feminism	is	 in	the	past,	and	thus	that	






opportunities	 for	women	and	men,	but	 tend	 to	experience	 feminism	as	both	 ‘everywhere	and	
nowhere’.	 The	 ‘everywhere’	 refers	 both	 to	 feminism’s	 professional	 institutionalization	 and	 to	
the	ways	that	liberal	feminist	values	have	permeated	popular	culture	in	much	the	same	way	that	
fluoride	invisibly	permeates	public	drinking	water	(in	fact,	Reger	(2012)	refers	to	today’s	youth	
as	 ‘generation	 fluoride’).	 However,	 feminism	 today	 is	 also	 experienced	 as	 ‘nowhere’:	 young	
people	do	not	see	an	in‐the‐streets	mass	feminist	movement,	nor	do	they	see	any	reason	for	one.	
The	 continuing	 work	 of	 professional	 feminism	 is,	 to	 most	 young	 people,	 as	 invisible	 as	 the	
cavity‐prevention	work	of	fluoride	in	our	public	waters.		
	
As	 with	 any	 widely	 shared	 generational	 sensibility,	 postfeminism	 contains	 its	 own	
contradictions	 and	 limits.	 Most	 of	 the	 younger	 women	 in	 the	 supposedly	 ‘postfeminist’	
generation	 studied	 by	 Aronson	 (2003)	 appreciated	 the	 accomplishments	 of	 the	 feminist	
movement	 and	 many	 recognized	 the	 existence	 of	 continued	 gender	 inequalities.	 However,	
Aronson	described	roughly	half	of	them	as	 ‘fence‐sitters’,	passive	supporters	of	feminist	goals,	
thus	 leaving	open	 the	question	of	 how,	or	under	what	 conditions,	postfeminist	 consciousness	














into	 a	 postfeminist	 sensibility	 that	 is	 coterminous	 with	 a	 larger	 political	 shift	 to	 neoliberal	
celebrations	 of	 individual	 market	 consumption	 choices	 as	 drivers	 for	 progress.	 And	
postfeminism	 is	perfectly	 consistent	with	–	 indeed	 is	 shaped	by	 and	helps	 to	naturalize	–	 the	
eclipse	 of	 feminist	 language	 and	 politics	 within	 the	 professionalized	 non‐profit	 industrial	
complex.	Postfeminism	also	works	in	tandem	with	shifts	in	the	political	economy,	including	the	
nearly	 four‐decade‐long	 trend	 of	 deindustrialization	 that	 accompanied	 the	 ascendance	 of	




The	 early	 1980s	 recession	 accelerated	 a	 continuing	deindustrialization	 of	 the	American	 labor	
force	 that	 resulted	 in	 the	 elimination	 of	millions	 of	 unionized	 jobs,	 rising	 levels	 of	 structural	
unemployment,	and	the	growth	of	low‐paid	non‐unionized	service	sector	jobs	(Wilson	1989).	As	




individuals	 and	 corporations	 and	 cutting	 support	 for	 welfare	 and	 education.	 These	 shifts	
continued	 in	 subsequent	 decades,	 resulting	 in	 the	 dramatic	 growth	 of	 a	 super‐rich	 class	 of	
people,	a	shrinking	middle	class	and	a	growing	proportion	of	working	poor	in	the	population.		












–	disproportionately	men	of	color	–	 faced	an	 increasingly	bleak	 field	of	economic	opportunity	
(Wilson	1996).		
	
As	 the	 1990s	 came	 to	 a	 close,	 Connell	 (1995)	 documented	 how	 the	 crumbling	 structural	
foundation	 for	 the	 male	 breadwinner	 role	 had	 escalated	 the	 gender	 insecurities	 of	 young	
working	class	men.	Deteriorating	public	schools,	declining	hope	for	decent	 jobs	in	inner	cities,	
and	the	expansion	of	prisons	combined	to	create	–	especially	for	younger	generations	of	black	
and	 brown	 boys	 and	 young	men	 –	 contexts	 conducive	 to	 skyrocketing	 school	 dropout	 rates,	
neighborhood	 gang	 activity,	 illegal	 commerce	 in	 the	 informal	 economy,	 and	 high	 levels	 of	
domestic	abuse	and	other	forms	of	violence	against	women	(DeKeseredy,	Shahid	and	Schwartz	
2003;	Flores	and	Hondagneu‐Sotelo	2013;	Rios	2011).	And	right	at	the	time,	when	the	broader	





The	 three	 trends	 I	 have	 outlined	 –	 professionally	 institutionalized	 feminism,	 the	 emergent	
culture	 of	 postfeminism,	 and	 a	 post‐industrial	 political	 economy	 characterized	 by	






higher	 education,	 popular	 culture	 and	 politics,	 and	 the	 growing	 public	 awareness	 of	 the	
institutionalization	of	women’s	rights,	sparked	journalistic	and	political	hand‐wringing	about	a	
supposed	‘war	against	boys’	in	public	schools	and	a	widespread	‘decline	of	males’	in	the	public	









anti‐feminism.	 In	 a	 sense,	 I	 am	 suggesting	 that	 the	 institutional	 deck	 is	 stacked	 against	 overt	
anti‐feminist	 backlash,	 be	 it	 frontal	 attacks	 on	 Title	 IX	 in	 schools,	 or	 men’s	 rights	 groups’	
challenges	 to	 the	state’s	 (still	minimal)	 support	 for	women’s	 shelters.	While	 this	outcome	can	
and	should	be	seen	as	feminist	success,	I	am	not	arguing	that	it	is	time	for	a	celebratory	feminist	
victory	lap.	History,	to	be	sure,	has	not	ended.	Dragiewicz’s	(2008,	2011)	research	on	US	men’s	
rights	groups’	 attempts	 to	 stop	state	 funding	of	women’s	 shelters	 shows	how	 this	moment	of	
gender	formation	still	includes	openings	for	anti‐feminist	backlash,	as	does	Girard’s	(2009)	and	
Mann’s	 (2012)	 research	 on	 similar	 efforts	 in	 Canada.	 However	 the	 story	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 this	
research	 also	 illustrates	 the	 legal	 limits	 of	 such	backlash;	 after	 all,	 professional	 feminist	 legal	
activists	 defeated	 the	 anti‐feminist	 actions	 analyzed	 by	Dragiewicz,	 Girard	 and	Mann.	 Today,	












Farrell’s	 analysis	 in	 the	1980s	 and	 early	 1990s	 drifted	 from	 the	 liberal	 feminist	 symmetry	 of	
men’s	 liberation	 to	asserting	 in	his	book	The	Myth	of	Male	Power	 (1993)	 that	 there	are	many	
ways	 in	 which	 men	 are	 victimized	 by	 women’s	 less	 visible	 forms	 of	 power.	 For	 instance,	 in	
response	to	women’s	attempts	to	stop	sexual	harassment	in	workplaces,	Farrell	claimed	that	in	
fact	 it	 was	 male	 employers	 who	 were	 disempowered	 and	 victimized	 by	 their	 secretaries’	
‘miniskirt	 power,	 cleavage	 power,	 and	 flirtation	 power’.	 In	 his	 more	 recent	 public	 speeches,	
however,	Farrell	 appears	 to	have	 returned	 to	a	 less	 combative	 language	of	 gender	 symmetry,	
reminiscent	of	his	mid‐1970s	perspective	(Farrell	2014).	While	it	may	seem	on	the	surface	that	
men	are	privileged	with	higher	status	and	higher	paying	 jobs,	Farrell	asserts,	men	pay	a	huge	
price	 for	accepting	the	 increased	responsibilities	that	come	with	these	 jobs.	Women	just	don’t	
choose	to	enter	higher	paying	careers,	he	claims,	and	they	are	smart	to	reject	the	stress;	their	
lives	 are	 better	 for	 it.	 Farrell’s	 insistence	 that	 gender	 divisions	 of	 labor	 result	 not	 from	
institutional	 discrimination	 against	 women,	 but	 rather	 from	 the	 accumulated	 individual	
‘choices’	 of	women	 and	men	 is	 consistent	with	 current	 neoliberal	 cheerleading	 for	 individual	
women	 to	 ‘lean	 in’	 to	 compete	with	men	 as	 professionals	 or	 corporate	 leaders.	 But	 Farrell’s	
twist	 is	 that	women’s	 refusals	 to	 lean	 in	and	compete	are	actually	healthy	and	smart	choices;	
men	are	the	chumps	for	working	so	hard	for	public	success.	
	
Farrell’s	 strategy	 is	 to	 raise	 sympathies	 for	men,	not	 to	engage	 in	anti‐feminist	polemics.	 In	a	
postfeminist	 context,	 this	 more	 moderate	 men’s	 rights	 discourse	 is	 likely	 to	 ring	 true	 as	
reasonable,	 as	 common	 sense.	 In	 this	 worldview,	 the	 women’s	 movement	 succeeded	 in	
improving	women’s	lives,	and	the	logical	flip‐side	is	this:	in	the	absence	of	a	symmetrical	men’s	
movement	 to	 improve	 men’s	 lives,	 men	 suffer	 harm.	While	 anti‐feminist	 vitriol	 continues	 to	
mark	men’s	rights	discourse	on	the	Internet	(Dragiewicz	2008,	2011),	the	emergent	‘moderate’	
voice	 of	 the	men’s	 rights	 movement	 does	 not	 directly	 attack	 feminism	 or	 disparage	 women.	
Rather,	it	maneuvers	in	the	postfeminist	interstices	between	the	‘everywhere’	and	the	‘nowhere’	
of	 feminism.	 The	 means	 to	 improve	 men’s	 lives	 are	 articulated	 to	 the	 general	 public	 in	 a	
depoliticized	 and	 individualized	 ‘equality	 language’	 (Behre	 2015)	 that	 resonates	 in	 a	
postfeminist	 and	 neoliberal	 context	 where	 present‐day	 feminism	 seems	 to	 be	 ‘nowhere’.	
Meanwhile,	leaders	such	as	Farrell	(2014)	are	apparently	coming	to	realize	that	they	need	not	







privileged	 men’s	 gender	 strategies	 in	 recent	 years,	 after	 all,	 is	 to	 present	 one’s	 self	 as	 an	

















right	 wing	 anti‐statism	 appeals	 to	 many	 lower‐middle	 class	 whites,	 the	 men’s	 rights	




Indeed,	 in	 their	 study	 of	 poor	working	 class	 fathers	 in	 Philadelphia	 and	 Camden,	 sociologists	
Edin	and	Nelson	(2014)	found	that	the	men	they	studied	frequently	express	‘a	profound,	abiding	
mistrust	 of	 women’;	 they	 think	 ‘the	 system’	 that	 enforces	 child	 support	 automatically	 and	
unfairly	 favors	mothers,	who	 themselves	are	gatekeepers	who	keep	 the	men	away	 from	 their	
own	 children.	 These	 men	 feel	 as	 though	 they	 have	 few	 rights,	 while	 both	 mothers	 and	 ‘the	




in	 the	 responsibilities	 of	 birth	 control,	 and	 then	 also	 share	 equally	 the	 responsibilities	 of	 child	
support	 and	 childcare	before	divorce,	 then	you	 can	 share	 parental	 rights	 afterwards’.	 But	 the	




as	 foot	 soldiers	 in	 anti‐feminist	 collective	 action.	But	 if	 current	 industrial	 nations	 continue	 to	
lack	the	will	to	address	the	many	ways	in	which	a	huge	strata	of	young	men	are	being	treated	as	
dispensable	by	 the	economy	and	 the	criminal	 justice	 system,	 it	 is	possible	 that	 some	of	 these	




The	 recent	 institutionalization	 and	 professionalization	 of	 feminism	 has	 included	 a	 modest	
expansion	 of	 opportunities	 for	 men	 professionals	 to	 work	 on	 gender	 issues	 in	 social	 work,	
academia,	law	and	other	fields.	This	expanding	base	of	men’s	professional	action	in	gender	fields	










and	 domestic	 violence.	 But	 some	 feminists	 in	 the	 anti‐rape	 and	 anti‐domestic	 violence	
community	 are	 also	 cautious	 about	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 male	 allies	 still	 benefit	 from	 male	
privilege	 that	works	 to	 the	detriment	 of	women	 professional	 colleagues	 (Messner,	 Greenberg	
and	Peretz	2015).	And	in	a	context	of	postfeminism,	long‐time	feminist	activists	fear	that,	just	as	
the	 field	of	 gender‐based	violence	prevention	has	expanded	 to	 include	more	men,	 the	politics	
underlying	 anti‐violence	 actions	 have	 thinned,	 severing	 action	 from	 feminist	 historical	 and	
political	roots	(Greenberg	and	Messner	2014).		
	








widespread	 ideologies	 of	 postfeminism,	 coupled	 with	 depoliticized	 and	 marketized	 anti‐
violence	 initiatives,	 threaten	 to	 further	 erase	 feminist	 women’s	 organizational	 leadership	 as	
well	 as	 the	 feminist	 analysis	 that	underlies	 anti‐violence	work.	Today’s	 anti‐violence	workers	
commonly	refer	to	‘the	movement’	not	as	an	eruption	of	mass	activism,	but	as	a	network	of	like‐
minded	anti‐violence	professionals,	and	they	talk	of	‘politics’	not	in	terms	of	activism	aimed	to	
bring	about	 structural	 transformations,	but	as	 strategies	designed	 to	keep	 their	organizations	
funded	 (Messner,	 Greenberg	 and	 Peretz	 2015).	 Much	 of	 the	 violence	 prevention	 curricula	









feminist	women	 in	 the	 field,	who	mentor	younger	cohorts	of	professional	women	and	men	 in	
ways	that	keep	feminist	analysis	and	goals	at	the	center	of	the	work.	A	second	source	of	change,	
potentially	more	transformative,	 lies	 in	the	recent	growth	of	diversity	among	men	in	the	anti‐
violence	 field.	 As	 the	 field	 has	 expanded	 in	 the	 US,	 the	 opportunities	 for	 men	 to	 work	 in	
internships	 and	 paid	 jobs	 in	 rape	 and	 domestic	 violence	 prevention,	 state	 and	 foundation	
funders	have	increasingly	targeted	violence	prevention	efforts	to	communities	of	boys	and	men	
considered	to	be	‘at	risk’	due	to	poverty,	crumbling	schools,	and	high	rates	of	gang	violence	and	






infusing	 a	 much‐needed	 intersectional	 perspective	 into	 professional	 anti‐violence	 work.	
Intersectionality	–	 the	perspective	 that	 takes	 the	 simultaneity	of	gender,	 race,	 class	and	other	
forms	of	 ‘intersecting’	 inequalities	 as	 its	 conceptual	 core	 –	 has	 long	been	 central	 in	 academic	





Men	 of	 color’s	 movement	 into	 professionalized	 anti‐violence	 work	 brings	 to	 the	 field	 not	 so	
much	 a	 background	 in	 academic	 intersectionality	 but,	 rather,	 an	 experience‐based	 organic	
intersectionality,	different	in	two	ways	from	the	experiences	of	most	white	middle‐class	men	in	
the	 field.	 First,	 young	men	 of	 color	 frequently	 begin	with	 a	 commitment	 to	 addressing	 boys’	
vulnerabilities	to	various	forms	of	violence	–	in	the	home,	in	the	street,	and	from	police.	These	
young	men	often	began	working	with	boys	around	gang	and	substance	abuse	issues,	in	college	
internships	 and	 then	 paid	 jobs	 in	 non‐profit	 organizations.	 In	 that	work,	 they	 discovered	 the	
links	between	young	men’s	vulnerabilities	to	multiple	forms	of	violence	with	their	experiences	
with	rape	and	domestic	violence.	In	short,	it	was	through	doing	‘race	and	class’	work	with	young	


















a	 ready	 resource	 for	 understanding	 connections	 between	 violence	 against	women	with	 other	




The	 progressive	 potential	 of	 the	 rise	 of	 organic	 intersectionality	 in	 the	 anti‐violence	 field	 is	
twofold.	First,	it	has	direct	appeal	to	young	boys	in	poor	communities	because	they	can	see	their	
stake	 in	 working	 for	 change	 in	 their	 schools	 and	 communities.	 Second,	 it	 can	 re‐infuse	 a	
powerful	 dose	 of	 radical	 social	 justice‐oriented	 politics	 back	 into	 a	 professionalized	 anti‐







and	 enable	 certain	 forms	 of	 men’s	 gender	 politics.	 The	 gender	 formation	 of	 the	 1970s,	
constituted	 by	 a	 mass	 feminist	 movement	 operating	 for	 the	 most	 part	 outside	 of	 male‐
dominated	 institutions,	 created	 a	 context	 for	 the	 rise	 of	 an	 internally‐contradictory	 men’s	
liberation	 movement	 that	 soon	 split	 into	 an	 anti‐feminist	 men’s	 rights	 movement,	 and	
supportive	pro‐feminist	men’s	organizations.		
	
For	 feminism,	 and	 for	 men’s	 activism	 around	 gender	 issues,	 the	 current	 moment	 of	 gender	
formation	is	constituted	 in	part	by	three	 large	shifts	that	accelerated	 in	the	1980s	and	1990s:		
the	 professional	 institutionalization	 of	 feminism;	 the	 rise	 of	 postfeminism;	 and	 neoliberal	
transformations	in	the	political	economy.	In	the	US	and	across	western	jurisdictions,	the	radical	
possibilities	 of	 feminism	were	 largely	 eclipsed	 behind	 the	 rise	 of	 non‐profit	 and	 state‐driven	
initiatives	 that	 confront	 issues	 like	 gender‐based	 violence	 through	 a	 professionalized	 and	
marketized	public	health	model.	While	this	context	has	not	closed	off	the	possibilities	for	men’s	
anti‐feminist	backlash	–	including	vitriolic	Internet‐based	misogyny	and	efforts	to	oppose	state	
funding	 for	 ‘women’s	 issues’	 –	 I	 have	 pointed	 to	 two	 formations	 that	 might	 prove	 to	 be	 of	
greater	concern	than	overt	antifeminism.	First,	postfeminism	and	neoliberalism	create	a	context	
conducive	to	a	‘kinder‐gentler’	moderate	men’s	rights	strategy	that	skirts	analysis	of	structural	
inequalities	 in	 favor	of	a	common‐sense	celebration	of	 individual	choice	 for	women	and	men.	





Second,	 I	 have	 argued	 that	 the	 current	 moment	 of	 gender	 formation	 has	 expanded	 the	
possibilities	for	men’s	participation	as	allies	with	women	in	anti‐violence	work.	While	this	is	a	
welcome	development	 for	most	 feminists,	on	 the	one	hand,	 the	current	professionalization	of	








the	 field.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 very	 social	 forces	 –	 neoliberalization	 of	 the	 economy,	
criminalization	of	poor	young	men	of	color	–	that	some	fear	might	form	the	basis	for	an	army	of	
angry	anti‐feminist	men’s	 rights	activists,	have	also	created	 the	conditions	 for	a	movement	of	
young	men	of	color	into	the	gender‐based	violence	prevention	field.	
	
This	 influx	 of	men	 of	 color	 into	 the	 anti‐violence	 field	 has	 introduced	 a	 perhaps	 unexpected	
progressive	counterforce	against	the	ways	in	which	professionalized	anti‐violence	efforts	under	
neoliberalism	 approach	 sexual	 assault	 or	 domestic	 violence	 as	 discrete,	 public	 health	 issues.	
Men	 of	 color’s	 organically	 intersectional	 understandings	 of	 violence,	 coupled	 with	 resources	
from	feminist	social	justice	research,	have	led	to	the	development	of	innovative	strategies	in	the	




women	 are	 a	 central	 thread	 in	 a	 broad	 intersectional	 framework	 that	 also	 addresses	 the	
institutionalized	 violences	 of	 racism,	 poverty,	 unemployment,	 declining	 schools,	 and	 the	
criminal	justice	system.		
	
Does	 feminism	 risk	 being	 lost	 in	 the	 social	 justice	 configuration	 now	 emerging	 in	 the	




feminist	women	of	 color.	And	here	 is	where	 the	 continued	 importance	and	power	of	 feminist	
professionals	 and	 institutions	 come	 into	play:	 veteran	 feminists	 can	keep	 alive	 the	 flame	of	 a	
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